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Abstract—The vulnerability of facial recognition systems to
face morphing attacks is well known. Many different approaches
for morphing attack detection (MAD) have been proposed in
the scientific literature. However, the MAD algorithms proposed
so far have mostly been trained and tested on datasets whose
distributions of image characteristics are either very limited (e.g.,
only created with a single morphing tool) or rather unrealistic
(e.g., no print-scan transformation). As a consequence, these
methods easily overfit on certain image types and the results
presented cannot be expected to apply to real-world scenarios.
For example, the results of the latest NIST FRVT MORPH show
that the majority of submitted MAD algorithms lacks robustness
and performance when considering unseen and challenging
datasets.
In this work, subsets of the FERET and FRGCv2 face
databases are used to create a realistic database for training and
testing of MAD algorithms, containing a large number of ICAO-
compliant bona fide facial images, corresponding unconstrained
probe images, and morphed images created with four different
face morphing tools. Furthermore, multiple post-processings are
applied on the reference images, e.g., print-scan and JPEG2000
compression. On this database, previously proposed differential
morphing algorithms are evaluated and compared. In addition,
the application of deep face representations for differential MAD
algorithms is investigated. It is shown that algorithms based on
deep face representations can achieve very high detection per-
formance (less than 3% D-EER) and robustness with respect to
various post-processings. Finally, the limitations of the developed
methods are analyzed.
Index Terms—Biometrics, face recognition, morphing attacks,
morphing attack detection, differential attack detection, deep face
representation
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGE morphing techniques can be used to combineinformation from two (or more) images into one image.
Morphing techniques can also be used to create a morphed
facial image from the biometric face images of two individ-
uals, of which the biometric information is similar to that of
both individuals. Realistically looking morphed face images
can be generated by unskilled users applying readily available
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(a) Subject 1 (b) Morph (c) Subject 2
Fig. 1. Example for a morphed face image (b) of subject 1 (a) and subject
2 (c). The Morph was manually created using FantaMorph.
tools [1]. An example of a morphed facial image is shown as
part of Figure 1.
In many countries, the facial image submitted for an elec-
tronic travel document is provided by the applicant either
in analogue (i.e., print on paper) or digital form. Therefore,
an attacker (e.g., a wanted criminal or a foreigner without
authorization to enter a territory) could morph his face image
with the face image of a similar looking accomplice who could
apply for a passport or another electronic travel document with
the morphed image. Since many morphed images are similar
enough to deceive human examiners as well as automatic face
recognition systems [2], [3], the attacker can then use the
electronic travel document issued to the accomplice to pass
through automatic or manual border controls. The vulnera-
bility of automated face recognition systems against such a
Morphing Attack (MA) was initially showcased in [4]. The
potential to launch a MA in practice was demonstrated by
members of the political activist group Peng! Kollektiv, who
succeeded without any problem in applying for a passport
with a morphed face image1. Morphing attacks can be applied
to other modalities as well. Whether a system is susceptible
to this kind of attack can be theoretically examined with the
framework presented in [5] and [6].
Many approaches for Morphing Attack Detection (MAD)
algorithms have already been published in the scientific liter-
ature. Most of them can be categorized as single image MAD
algorithms, which examine only the potentially morphed face
image, as opposed to differential MAD methods that compare
the image in question with a trusted probe image (e.g.,
a live capture). While many publications report impressive
detection rates, these results are hardly applicable to real-
world scenarios. Firstly, the datasets used for evaluation are
not realistic. In particular, most publications ([18], [19], [20]
1Peng! Kollektiv, MaskID: https://pen.gg/de/campaign/maskid/
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
01
20
2v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 A
pr
 20
20
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 2
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF MOST RELEVANT DIFFERENTIAL MAD ALGORITHMS.
Reference Approach Category Morphing method Source face database Post-processing Remarks
Scherhag et al. [7]
Differences in BSIF features
with SVM
Feature comparison
triangulation
+ blending
FRGCv2 [8] – –
Scherhag et al. [9]
Differences in angles of
landmark pairs with SVM
Feature comparison
triangulation
+ blending
ARface [10] – –
Damer et al. [11]
Directed distances of landmarks
with SVM
Feature comparison
triangulation
+ blending
(+ swapping)
FERET [12] – –
Ferrara et al. [13] Demorphing Morphing reversion
triangulation
+ blending, GIMP/GAP
ARface [10] – –
Ferrara et al. [14] Demorphing Morphing reversion
triangulation
+ blending, GIMP/GAP
ARface [10],
CAS-PEAL-R1 [15]
–
CAS-PEAL-R1 contains images
with pose variations
Peng et al. [16] GAN-based Demorphing Morphing reversion
triangulation
+ blending [17]
in-house – –
and [21] being exceptions) do not consider variations in post-
processings of the images, e.g., print-scan transformation or
severe compression, which can occur in real-world scenar-
ios and may drastically reduce detectable artefacts from the
morphing process. In addition, the vast majority of previous
publications on differential MAD (with the notable exception
of [14]) use probe images that do not exhibit a realistic intra-
subject variance, e.g., facial pose and expression, illumination,
the subject’s appearance (glasses, beard, hair style, clothing,
cosmetics) and aging. Secondly, the datasets used for training
and evaluation are not sufficiently distinct but contain images
with similar characteristics. In particular, the test sets typically
contain only morphed images generated with the same tools as
the images in the training set. Consequently, the low error rates
reported in these publications may simply reflect an overfitting
to the specific and unrealistic properties of the images used.
This suspicion is supported by the recent results of the Face
Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) MORPH test [22] conducted
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
where none of the submitted algorithms achieved satisfactory
performance for all test scenarios.
The main contributions of this work are:
• A conceptual categorization of published MAD ap-
proaches including technical considerations and trade-
offs, along with a more detailed survey of relevant
differential MAD schemes.
• The creation of a face database containing a large number
of ICAO-compliant bona fide and morphed reference
images (created using four different morphing algorithms)
as well as corresponding unconstrained probe images,
which are obtained from different image sources, i.e., face
image databases; the use of image post-processings which
are likely to be applied in real world, i.e., JPEG2000
compression or print-scan transformations, together with
the selection of probe images exhibiting variations in
facial pose and expression as well as illumination and
focus enable the training and testing of MAD algorithms
in a realistic scenario.
• The proposal of differential MAD based on deep face rep-
resentations; by employing state-of-the-art face recogni-
tion systems, rich and compact deep facial representations
are extracted from pairs of reference and probe images
and combined to train machine learning-based classifiers
to detect image alterations induced by morphing algo-
rithms.
• A comprehensive vulnerability assessment of state-of-the-
art face recognition systems against MAs followed by a
scenario-based evaluation of the proposed MAD concept
applying a commercial and two open-source deep face
recognition systems; it is shown that the MAD based
on deep face representations outperforms previously pro-
posed differential MAD schemes, which is also confirmed
by the latest NIST FRVT MORPH report [22].
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: related
works on MAD are summarized in Section II. In Section III we
describe the databases set up for our investigations. Section IV
describes our approach to develop MAD algorithms based
on deep face representations. In Section V we evaluate our
approach and compare the results with our evaluation of
other state-of-the-art MAD algorithms. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, numerous MAD approaches have been
proposed. The following subsections give a rough overview
of single image and differential MAD algorithms. A more
detailed listing and description of the individual algorithms
can be found in [1].
A. Single Image MAD
Single image MAD approaches can be categorized as texture
descriptors, e.g., in [23], forensic image analysis, e.g., in [24],
and methods based on deep neural networks, e.g., in [25].
These differ in the artefacts they can potentially detect.
Texture descriptors, e.g., Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [26]
or Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [27], attempt to
extract discriminative information from images, which can be
employed for the purpose of texture classification. The morph
process averages the images, which results in smoothed skin
textures. Furthermore, ghost artefacts or half-shade effects can
occur due to regions that do not overlap exactly (e.g., hair). In
particular, in the area of the pupils and nostrils these artefacts
appear more frequently, for examples the reader is referred to
[28]. In addition, distorted edges or shifted image areas can
occur. These types of artefacts can be easily represented and
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 3
detected using texture descriptors in multiple ways [29], [30],
[7], [20], [21], [23], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37].
Under the assumption that the morphing process leaves
specific traces in the image, forensic image analysis techniques
can be used to detect them. By averaging the images, the
sensor pattern noise is changed. It was shown in [38], [39],
[40], [41], [42] that these changes can be used for MAD.
Under the assumption that the images are intermediately
stored during the morph creation process employing lossy
compression algorithms, double compression artefacts can be
analyzed [17], [43]. Furthermore, inconsistencies in the image,
e.g., inconsistent illumination [44] or color values, might be
evaluated.
Deep neural networks can be used to detect morphs in two
different ways. Firstly, a new neural network is trained from
scratch or an existing neural network is re-trained [19], [25],
[45] for the task of MAD. Deep neural nets can theoretically be
trained to detect any artefact. Therefore, it is important that the
training data contains a high variance, to avoid overfitting to
algorithm and database specific artefacts. Secondly, the feature
vectors (embeddings) extracted by existing deep nets can be
employed for MAD [34]. Since the neural network was not
trained on morphed facial images, it can be assumed that no
overfitting to unrealistic morphing artefacts occurs.
B. Differential MAD
Published differential methods and their properties are listed
in Table I. Differential MAD can be divided into two cate-
gories. The first category are algorithms that compare feature
vectors extracted from extracted from trusted live captures and
potential morphs. Single image algorithms can be extended to
differential algorithms, e.g., by estimating differences between
feature vectors [7]. The additional information of the trusted
live capture might improve the performance and robustness of
the detection algorithm. Further, algorithms explicitly utilizing
this additional information have been introduced in [9], [11],
where the distances between features of facial landmarks are
estimated.
The second category contains algorithms that try to reverse
the process of morphing. Here the assumption is that if
two subjects are represented in the morphed image and the
trusted live capture is subtracted from the possibly morphed
reference, in the case of a morphed face image the identity
of the second subject becomes more dominant, leading to a
lower face recognition scores. If there is no other subject in
the image, only the existing one remains. In [13], [14] the
so-called demorphing algorithm was proposed, an approach
where reversion is done explicitly. In addition to the explicit
demorphing approach, demorphing based on a Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) is proposed in [16].
III. CREATION OF MAD DATABASE
For the development and evaluation of MAD algorithms,
bona fide and morphed reference images are required. In
order to resemble passport photos, these images should meet
the requirements of the ICAO passport photo quality stan-
dards [46]. Multiple tools should be used to generate morphed
images to represent a sufficient variance of MAs. In addition,
the reference images (bona fide and morphed) should have
undergone various realistic post-processings including strong
JPG2000 compression and print-scan transformation. For the
investigation of differential MAD, additional probe images
are needed. In order to simulate the important use-case of
automatic border control, theses probe images should resemble
live-captures taken in eGates. Since these recordings are semi-
controlled the quality of the captured samples is degraded and
does not comply to the ICAO requirements. A much higher
variance can be expected, e.g., with respect to pose, facial
expression, illumination, and background. Furthermore, as the
border control can occur up to ten years after the passport
application, reference and probe images can significantly differ
with respect to the subject’s appearance (glasses, beard, hair
style, clothing, cosmetics) and age.
Unfortunately, there is yet no public database available that
contains facial images which exhibit all of the mentioned prop-
erties. Therefore, we decided to set up a new MAD database
based on existing face image databases. In this section, the
required steps, including the selection of the images from
public face image databases, for the generation of the morphed
images, the pairing of reference and probe images, and the
application of post-processings to the images, are described in
detail.
A. Selection of the Facial Image Database
In a first step, we selected public databases from which we
could build our MAD database. The candidate database had
to fulfill the following conditions:
• It must contain images (meeting the subsequent condi-
tions) of a sufficient amount of different subjects.
• The images must have a sufficient resolution.
• For each subject, at least two ICAO-compliant face
images must be available (one of which used as input
for morph generation and the other as bona fide).
• For each subject, at least one image taken in less con-
strained conditions (resembling the border control sce-
nario) must be available.
Among the available databases, FERET [12] and
FRGCv2 [8] are suitable. The samples of FERET are
all taken in a controlled environment but contain variations
in pose and expression. FRGCv2 contains images suitable
as passport photos, but also images with scenario variations,
e.g., non-uniform illumination, lack of sharpness and uneven
background, suitable as probe images.
The FERET and the FRGCv2 face databases were collected
over a period of three and two years, respectively. This means
the maximum age variation of captured subjects is limited
by these periods. That is, selected face images of the used
databases exhibit less variations with respect to temporal dif-
ference between the capturing of reference and probe images
than those expected in a border control scenario. However,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, publicly available
databases which contain face images captured over a larger
period of time do not fulfill the aforementioned requirements.
Moreover, we stress that large age variations are only expected
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to occur for bona fide authentication attempts. For an MA it
is more plausible that it will be performed using current face
images of the attacker and the accomplice which results in a
small temporal difference between capturing of reference and
probe images.
B. Selection of Image Candidates
For each of these databases, we select two types of images,
representing the reference, i.e., passport photographs, and the
unconstrained probe images, i.e., trusted live captures.
The set of reference images contains all images complying
with ICAO requirements [46] except alignment of the face.
These images exhibit, among other requirements, uniform illu-
mination, good focus, a neutral face expression with open eyes
and no visible teeth, neutral background and no reflections
in glasses. For these images, we adjusted the alignment of
the face by suitable scaling, rotation and padding/cropping to
ensure that the ICAO requirements with respect to the eyes’
positions are met. Precisely, facial landmarks are detected
applying the Dlib algorithm [47] and alignment is performed
with respect to the detected eye coordinates where a fixed
intra-eye distance of 180 pixels is ensured.
From the remaining images, those suitable as probe images
to resemble the border crossing capture process were selected.
The face should be recognizable, but can be only partially
illuminated and slightly out of focus. The selected images
of the FERET database yield a variance in facial expression
and pose (slight rotations). For FRGCv2, the selected images
yield a variance in facial expression, background, illumination
and sharpness. The probe images are additionally converted
to grayscale. This conversion is motivated by the fact that
some eGates capture grayscale images. Nonetheless, if face
image quality is sufficient, the use of grayscale probe images is
expected to have negligible impact on the recognition accuracy
of state-of-the-art face recognition systems as well as human
examiners [48], [49].
Examples of the reference and probe images of both
databases are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Note that the
criteria used to select suitable image candidates, which are
necessary to resemble a realistic scenario, clearly limit the
amount of appropriated images. Eventually, it is important to
note that the selection of face images is to a certain degree
subjective. In order to facilitate reproducibility of this research
the list of selected face images is made available to the
research community (upon acceptance).
C. Selection of Images and Morph Creation
For each subject, we selected from all available reference
images a subset of bona fide reference images and a subset
of images for generating morphs, i.e., morph input images, as
well as a subset of probe images. Where possible, we ensured
that the bona fide reference images were disjoint from the
morph input images, thereby avoiding a repetitive use of the
same image or same image parts during MAD training which
increases the variance of training data. No lossy compression
was applied to the images prior to post-processing. In addition,
we assured that selected reference images (bona fide or morph
(a) References
(b) Probes
Fig. 2. Examples of reference and gray scale probe images for FRGCv2.
(a) References
(b) Probes
Fig. 3. Examples of reference and gray scale probe images for FERET.
input images), if possible, are captured in a different recording
session than the probe images, in order to achieve temporal
difference between the capturing of reference and probe im-
ages as expected in a real border control scenario. For image
candidates selected from the FERET database, where possible,
we selected one bona fide reference image, one morph input
image, and up to two probe images per subject. For image
candidates selected from the FRGCv2 database, if possible,
we chose two bona fide reference images, two morph input
images, and up to five probe images per subject.
For the creation of morphs, the morph input images are
lexicographically sorted, and then each input image is morphed
with one of the next consecutive input image, for which the
following two criteria hold: both depicted subjects are of same
sex; only one face image of the image pair shows glasses.
The latter criteria should avoid obvious artefacts. Morph input
images are only used once, i.e., for the generation of a single
morph. It is important to note that after the morph generation
the morph input images are discarded. Again, we aim to avoid
a repeated use of the same image or same image parts in the
training stage of MAD algorithms which should also prevent
from overfitting caused by overrepresented image parts. The
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TABLE II
COMPOSITION OF THE MAD DATABASE. THE NUMBER OF MORPH IMAGES
IS MULTIPLIED BY THE NUMBER OF MORPHING TOOLS USED.
Database Subjects Male Female Reference Images Probes
Bona Fide Morphs
FERET 529 329 200 529 529∗ 791
FRGCv2 533 302 231 984 964∗ 1,726
∗per morphing algorithm
list of resulting face image pairs used for morph generation is
provided to the research community (upon acceptance). The
key figures of the resulting database are listed in Table II.
D. Morphing Algorithms
Four different automated morphing tools were used to create
morphed face images:
1) FaceFusion2, a proprietary morphing algorithm. Orig-
inally being an iOS app, we deployed an adaptation
for Windows which uses the 68 landmarks of Dlib
and Delaunay triangles. After the morphing process,
certain regions (eyes, nostrils, hair) of the first face
image are blended over the morph to hide artefacts. The
corresponding landmarks of upper and lower lips can be
reduced as described in [17] to avoid artefacts at closed
mouths. The created morphs have a high quality and
low to no visible artefacts. Example morphs are shown
in Figure 4b.
2) FaceMorpher3, an open-source implementation using
Python. In the version applied for this work, the algo-
rithm uses STASM for landmark detection. Delaunay
triangles, which are formed from the landmarks, are
wrapped and blended. The area outside the landmarks is
averaged. The generated morphs show strong artefacts in
particular in the area of neck and hair. Figure 4c depicts
examples of generated morphs.
3) OpenCV, a self-made morphing algorithm derived from
“Face Morph Using OpenCV”4. This algorithm works
similar to FaceMorpher. Important differences between
the algorithms are that for landmark detection Dlib is
used instead of STASM and that additional landmarks
are positioned at the edges of the image, which are
also used to create the morphs. Thus, in contrast to
FaceMorpher, the outer facial area does not consist of
an averaged image, but like the rest of the image, of
morphed triangles. However, visible artefacts outside
the face area can be observed, which is mainly due
to missing landmarks. Example morphs can be seen in
Figure 4d.
4) UBO-Morpher, the morphing tool of University of
Bologna, as used, e.g., in [13]. Dlib landmarks were
used for this algorithm. The morphs are generated by
triangulation, averaging and blending. To avoid the arte-
facts in the area outside the face, the morphed face is
2www.wearemoment.com/FaceFusion/
3github.com/alyssaq/face morpher
4www.learnopencv.com/face-morph-using-opencv-cpp-python/
copied to the background of one of the original images.
Even if the colors are adjusted at boundaries, visible
edges may appear at the transitions. Figure 4e shows
examples of resulting morphs.
No manual post-processing is applied in the morph generation
process. The use of various morphing tools which produce
facial morphs of different quality enable a thorough investi-
gation of MAD capabilities, i.e., impact of the use of high
and low quality morphs on training and testing of MAD
methods, see Section V. The evaluation of MAD algorithms
for different quality levels of morphed face images is also
performed by NIST in the FRVT MORPH [22]. The pairs
for the morphing process for each algorithm are selected
according the protocol defined in Section III-C, resulting in
4×529 morphed face images for FERET and 4×964 morphed
face images for FRGCv2. For both databases, the bona fide
and morphed face images are normalized to meet the ICAO-
requirements for passport images [46]. The resulting images
are of size 720×960 pixels.
E. Post-Processing
Images that have been captured for the use in an identity
document, e.g., passport, can go through various processing
steps before they are embedded, e.g., in a passport RFID
chip. To reflect this variety, the passport images (bona fide and
morphed) of the MAD database are post-processed in different
manners. An example for the different post-processings is
shown in Figure 5.
Unprocessed: The images are not further processed,
henceforth referred to as NPP (no post-processing).
NPP images serves as baseline.
Resized: The resolution of the images is reduced by
half, resulting in 360×480 pixels, in the following
text referred to as Resized. Resized images fulfill
the minimum requirement with respect to intra-eye
distance defined by ICAO, i.e., 90 pixels. This pre-
processing corresponds to the scenario that an image
is submitted digitally by the applicant.
JPEG2000: The images are resized by half and
then compressed using JPEG2000, a wavelet-based
image compression method that is recommended for
EU passports [50]. The setting is selected in a way
that a target file size of 15KB is achieved. This
scenario reflects the post-processing path of passport
images if handed over digitally at the application
desk, hereafter referred to as JP2.
Print/Scan – JPEG2000: The original images (un-
compressed and not resized) are first printed with
a high quality laser printer (Fujifilm Frontier 5700R
Minlab on Fujicolor Crystal Archive Paper Supreme
HD Lustre photo paper) and then scanned with a
premium flatbed scanner (Epson DS-50000) with
300 dpi. A dust and scratch filter is then applied
in order to reduce image noise. Subsequently, the
images are resized to 360×480 pixels, i.e., half
of the NPP images, and compressed to 15 KB
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(a) Subject 1 (b) FaceFusion (c) FaceMorpher (d) OpenCV (e) UBO-Morpher (f) Subject 2
Fig. 4. Examples for a morphed face images from all four algorithms for a female pair of face images from the FERET (top row) and the FRGCv2 (bottom
row). Equal weights of face images were used to create morphs. Face images depicting subjects with similar demographic attributes, e.g., age and ethnicity,
generally result in more plausible face morphs.
(a) NPP (b) Resized (c) JP2 (d) PS-JP2
Fig. 5. Examples of an original image and the three post-processing types.
using JPEG2000.5 This scenario reflects the post-
processing path of passport images if handed over
at the application desk as a printed photograph,
subsequently referred to as PS-JP2.
F. Validation of Attack Potential
The newly created databases differ considerably from other
databases used in scientific publications on MA and MAD.
In particular, the intra-class variation is much higher in our
database due to the selection of unconstrained probe images.
While this approach ensures that our database is more eligi-
ble to simulate real-world scenarios, it is perfectly valid to
question whether the use of unconstrained probe images may
render MA ineffective. Previous analyses of the vulnerability
of face recognition systems to MAs, e.g., in [4], [7], used
probe images, which nearly resembled passport images and,
hence, these studies do not apply to the face databases used in
this work. Therefore, we evaluated whether face recognition
5Due to the lustre print, the scans exhibit a visible pattern of the paper
surface, which is only partly removed by the dust and scratch filter and results
in stronger compression artefacts than for scans of glossy prints.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF COMPARISONS PER TEST SET.
Database Bona Fide Morph Attacks Impostors
FERET 791 791 418,966
FRGCv2 3,298 3,246 1,695,086
systems are also vulnerable to MAs using our newly created
databases.
Firstly, the face recognition performance is evaluated. The
amount of bona fide, i.e., genuine, and impostor comparisons,
i.e., all possible cross-comparisons of reference and probe
images of different subjects, for each database is summarized
in Table III. On each database, the decision thresholds of the
face recognition systems are set to achieve a False Match Rate
(FMR) of 0.1% according to the FRONTEX recommendation
for border control scenarios [51]. The results are presented in
Table IV and the corresponding Probability Density Functions
(PDFs) are depicted in Figure 6. For ArcFace and the COTS
system, no false non-matches occur at an FMR of 0.1%. Note
that this is also to be expected for using color probe images. In
general, it can be observed, that the genuine score distributions
of FERET are further right (higher similarity scores) than those
of FRGCv2. This is likely due to the fact, that the probes
of FRGCv2 contain a much higher variation in illumination,
sharpness and expression. Further, it can be seen, that the
impostor distributions of FERET and FRGCv2 are close to
each other, thus the thresholds are approximately the same
over both datasets.
Secondly, the vulnerability of the face recognition systems
against MAs is evaluated. The vulnerability assessment was
conducted using the metrics presented described in [28],
i.e., Mated Morph Presentation Match Rate (MMPMR) and
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Fig. 6. Probability Density Functions of comparison scores of genuine, impostor and morph comparisons for all three face recognition systems. Distance
scores obtained from ArcFace were multiplied by −1 to obtain similarity scores. τ depicts the estimated threshold for a FMR of 0.1%.
TABLE IV
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS (FRSS).
MMPMR/RMMR (in %)
FRS Database Decision
Threshold
FNMR at
FMR=0.1%
FaceFusion FaceMorpher OpenCV UBO-Morpher
MAs50 MAs25 MAs50 MAs25 MAs50 MAs25 MAs50 MAs25
ArcFace
FERET -1.10 0.0 93.0 17.3 75.7 5.0 79.9 6.7 92.9 2.3
FRGCv2 -1.06 0.0 77.2 14.7 50.0 8.9 54.0 9.2 72.4 7.2
COTS
FERET 0.54 0.0 96.0 33.1 88.6 10.0 91.3 13.0 96.9 5.5
FRGCv2 0.58 0.0 79.4 18.8 60.1 8.4 62.8 9.8 81.5 3.0
Relative Morph Match Rate (RMMR). The MMPMR de-
scribes the proportion of morphed face images accepted by
the face recognition system, the RMMR describes the relation
between the MMPMR and the true match rate. Since on
both databases no false non-matches occur for the considered
decision threshold the MMPMR and the RMMR are equal.
The vulnerability analysis is performed exclusively on the NPP
image sets of each database, as preliminary studies have shown
that the performance of facial recognition systems is only
slightly affected by the previously described post-processings.
An open-source face recognition system, namely ArcFace
[52], and one commercial off-the-shelf system, referred to as
COTS6, are employed in the vulnerability assessment. The
number of MAs performed for each database is summarized in
Table III. The corresponding results are depicted in Figure 6
and summarized in Table IV.
Two types of MAs are considered in the vulnerability
analysis. On the one hand, morphs with equal weights are
employed, i.e., facial images of both subjects contribute with
a weight of 50% to the resulting morph. MAs based on
these morphs are denoted as MAs50. On the other hand,
morphs in which the attacker contributes only with 25%
6We stress that this COTS system is not Eyedea, which is only used for
MAD.
to the morph are used. Corresponding MAs are referred to
as MAs25. This means, a larger weight is assigned to an
accomplice, i.e., 75%, who would present the morphed face
image to a human observer during the application process of
an identity document. Assuming that morphs generated with
equal weights of two face images are easily spotted by a
human inspection during the application process, the latter type
of MAs might be considered as more realistic [13].
Focusing on MAs50, ArcFace and the COTS system are
both very vulnerable to the MAs contained in the database.
This can be observed from the high MMPMR/RMMR values
in Table IV. Especially on the FERET dataset almost all
MAs are accepted. In contrast, the MMPMR/RMMR values,
i.e., success chance, significantly drop in case of MAs25. In
general, morphs created by morphing algorithms producing
less artefacts (FaceFusion and UBO-Morpher) are more likely
to pass the recognition system. In addition, it should be
noted that the morphs generated from the FERET database
are generally more successful in MAs than the morphs from
FRGCv2. This can be attributed to the different intra-class
variations of the two databases. Since the genuine comparisons
of the FERET data set achieve higher similarity scores, the
ones obtained by MAs also tend to be higher. As MAs25
achieve only small MMPMR/RMMR values only MAs50 are
considered for MAD. In case the attacker contributes with
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Fig. 7. Generic processing chain of face recognition systems based on neural
networks.
a lower weight to the morph compared the accomplice the
distance between the resulting morph and the probe image of
the attacker increases. Consequently, differential MAD method
will generally detect such MAs with higher chance, compared
to MAs where morphs have been created using equal weights
of the contributing face images.
IV. MAD BASED ON DEEP FACE REPRESENTATIONS
One of the greatest issue regarding existing differential
MAD algorithms is that they can not cope with the large intra-
class variance that must be expected for realistic probe images.
Deep face recognition networks, however, have shown that
they are able to work very robustly, even on challenging data.
Therefore, we propose to employ deep face representations
extracted by such deep face recognition systems for differential
MAD. Precisely, we use the following deep face recognition
systems:
• ArcFace [52], an up-to-date network with a topology
optimized for automatic facial recognition
• The commercial face recognition SDK from Eyedea7
• A re-implementation8 of the FaceNet algorithm [53]
In principle, it would by possible to apply transfer learning
and re-train a pre-trained deep face recognition network to
detect morphs. However, the high complexity of the model,
represented by the large number of weights in the neural
network, requires a large amount of training data. Even if
only the lower layers are re-trained, as done in [18], the
limited number of training images (and much lower number
of subjects) in our database can easily result in overfitting to
the characteristics of the training set.
Therefore, we follow an alternative approach. We use the
pre-trained deep face recognition networks as feature extrac-
tors and train our MAD algorithms on the deep representations
extracted by the neural network (on the lowest layer). Deep
face recognition systems leverage very large databases of face
images to learn rich and compact representations of faces.
While these feature vectors, i.e., deep face representations,
have not been trained to detect MAs, at least in the differential
scenario, they can, nevertheless, be very useful for MAD:
7https://www.eyedea.cz/eyeface-sdk/
8David Sandberg - Face Recognition using Tensorflow, URL: https://github.
com/davidsandberg/facenet
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Fig. 8. Overview of the proposed differential MAD system based on deep
face representations.
As a morphed face image does not only contain biometric
information of the attacker but also those of the accomplice,
its deep face representation is expected to, at least in certain
aspects, considerably deviate from those detected in the probe
image. On the other hand, since there were no morphed facial
images in the training set of the neural network, the features
can not contain information on image characteristics specific
for a certain morphing technique or tool, which reduces the
risk of overfitting.
Most deep face recognition systems work as shown in
Figure 7. The facial image is pre-processed and transferred
to the neural network trained for the extraction of deep face
representations. This net transfers the facial image into a
discriminatory feature space with smaller dimension (512 in
the case of ArcFace and FaceNet, 256 in the case of Eyedea).
If two images are to be compared, the distance of their
feature vectors, e.g., using the Euclidean distance, can serve
as dissimilarity score. Even though our vulnerability analysis
in Section III-F has shown that this measure is not suitable
to separate morphs from bona fide images, the feature vectors
can nevertheless contain sufficient information to detect MAs.
The processing of our MAD algorithms is shown in Fig-
ure 8. In the training stage, pre-processed bona fide or morphed
reference images and probe images are fed into the neural
network. The resulting deep face representations are combined
and subsequently processed by a machine learning-based clas-
sifier to learn to distinguish between bona fide authentication
attempts and MAs. During testing, a potentially morphed
reference image and a probe image are processed in the same
way and the previously trained classifier is used to estimate
the MAD score. A simple but effective combination of the
deep features is subtraction, i.e. estimation of a difference
vector, which preserves the dimensionality of the feature
vector and keeps the training effort low. For the classifier, we
tested various machine learning algorithms, namely AdaBoost,
Random Forest, Gradient Boosting and SVM. Consistently,
SVM with radial basis function as kernel showed the best
accuracy and was, thus, chosen for the MAD algorithm.
By employing the difference vectors of feature vectors
extracted from reference and probe images, a simple dimen-
sion reduction by Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) to two
dimensions shows that bona fide and morphs can be separated.
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(a) FERET: ArcFace (b) FRGCv2: ArcFace
(c) FERET: Eyedea (d) FRGCv2: Eyedea
(e) FERET: FaceNet (f) FRGCv2: FaceNet
Fig. 9. Scatter plots of MDS-reduced difference vectors of deep face
representations extracted from reference and probe images.
Corresponding scatter plots are provided in Figure 9. Each plot
shows data points for MAs using all of the four morphing
tools. Since, as shown in Section III-C, the subset of the
FRGCv2 allows more comparisons, the corresponding scatter
plots are much denser compared to the ones generated from
the FERET database. Nevertheless, for both databases it can
be seen that MAs and bona fide authentication attempts can be
separated on the basis of the difference vectors of deep face
representations obtained from ArcFace and Eyedea. Especially
the FERET database can be separated almost error-free using
the ArcFace algorithm for feature extraction. The FaceNet
feature vectors also allow a separation, but higher error rates
are expected.
V. EXPERIMENTS
Using the databases described in Section III, we evaluate
our MAD approach based on deep face representations de-
scribed in Section IV. In our first experiment, we benchmark
the accuracy of our approach together with that of other
differential MAD algorithms in the absence of image post-
processing. Then, we evaluate the robustness of our approach
against image post-processing. Finally, we analyze the score
distributions in more detail to gain insight on the causes of
classification errors.
For all evaluations presented in this section, we separate
training and test sets by source database; precisely, all al-
gorithms are trained using the default hyperparameters on
images originating from FERET and evaluated on images
from FRGCv2, and vice versa. This approach does not only
ensure a strict separation of training and test data, but also
a large variance in the image characteristics between these
sets. Furthermore, for all evaluations, each of the training
sets contains only images with the one of the four post-
processings and morphs created with one of the four morphing
algorithms (see Section III for details); i.e., we do not combine
several post-processings or morphing tools in one training set.
The numbers of MAs and bona fide authentication attempts
performed for each database during training and testing are
listed in Table III.
The accuracy of the detection algorithms is reported using
the Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER), i.e., at the deci-
sion threshold where the proportion of attack presentations
incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations (APCER) is as
high as the proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly
classified as presentation attack (BPCER). For APCER and
BPCER the definitions of ISO IEC 30107-3 [54] for measuring
accuracy of presentation attack detection are used:
APCER: proportion of attack presentations incor-
rectly classified as bona fide presentations in a
specific scenario
BPCER: proportion of bona fide presentations incor-
rectly classified as presentation attacks in a specific
scenario
Additionally, the BPCER10 is reported, i.e., the operation
point where APCER=10%.
A. Detection Accuracy in the Absence of Post-Processing and
Comparison with other MAD Algorithms
In this subsection, we evaluate the accuracy of our MAD
approach on the NPP images and compare its detection ac-
curacy to that of several other differential MAD approaches.
Beside the classifiers trained on deep face representations
extracted using ArcFace, Eyedea and FaceNet, we test two
MAD algorithms based on texture descriptors, namely LBP
[26] and BSIF [27] with patches of size 3×3 and an optional
division into 4×4 cells. In order to adapt these feature extrac-
tors to differential detection scenario, the difference between
the histograms of reference and probe images are used as
classifier input as proposed in [7]. Further, two landmark-
based algorithms implemented according to [11] are evaluated
using landmarks computed with Dlib [47] and Wing Loss [55],
respectively. Finally, we evaluate the demorphing algorithm of
[13] with a demorphing factor of 0.3 in combination with Dlib
landmarks and the COTS face recognition algorithm used in
Section III-F.
The results are shown in Table V. Note that the demorphing
algorithm is not trained, which is why for this MAD algo-
rithm in the table the specification of the morphing algorithm
used for training have no effect. Consistently, when testing
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TABLE V
DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF MAD ALGORITHMS ON NPP IMAGES USING DIFFERENT MORPHING TOOLS (MTS) FOR TRAINING AND TEST.
D-EER | BPCER-10 (in %)
Train DB Train MT Test MT ArcFace FaceNet Eyedea BSIF BSIF4×4 LBP LBP4×4 LM-Wing LM-Dlib Demorphing
FERET
FaceFusion
FaceFusion 6.2 | 3.5 25.9 | 52.7 15.1 | 22.6 39.6 | 75.8 39.8 | 77.5 38.7 | 82.4 41.0 | 82.0 42.5 | 83.3 44.5 | 83.0 8.6 | 4.4
FaceMorpher 3.6 | 0.7 21.7 | 41.0 12.4 | 14.7 41.8 | 83.5 43.5 | 86.5 38.6 | 91.6 42.7 | 92.7 41.5 | 81.2 43.6 | 83.0 3.4 | 0.0
OpenCV 3.7 | 0.8 21.7 | 40.7 12.3 | 14.8 42.8 | 82.8 43.5 | 83.7 39.7 | 86.5 42.6 | 87.9 42.5 | 82.1 43.9 | 82.8 3.8 | 0.8
UBO-Morpher 6.0 | 3.5 25.5 | 50.5 16.2 | 24.5 42.5 | 81.4 43.3 | 83.0 39.2 | 85.1 42.8 | 85.3 42.3 | 82.3 44.4 | 83.3 7.8 | 5.8
FaceMorpher
FaceFusion 7.1 | 4.5 26.3 | 53.4 16.2 | 24.9 49.3 | 83.3 46.7 | 83.4 48.1 | 87.1 46.3 | 87.5 43.9 | 81.7 43.8 | 88.1 8.6 | 4.4
FaceMorpher 3.3 | 0.5 19.8 | 36.4 10.3 | 10.4 50.2 | 88.0 47.5 | 88.6 48.1 | 93.2 45.5 | 95.2 42.0 | 79.1 43.0 | 87.7 3.4 | 0.0
OpenCV 3.7 | 0.7 20.7 | 37.8 10.5 | 11.5 51.3 | 86.5 49.1 | 86.5 48.8 | 89.0 47.1 | 90.7 43.2 | 80.0 42.7 | 87.2 3.8 | 0.8
UBO-Morpher 6.6 | 4.2 25.2 | 49.5 17.2 | 26.3 51.1 | 86.5 48.7 | 85.3 48.1 | 88.8 47.4 | 89.1 43.7 | 81.6 42.9 | 87.1 7.8 | 5.8
OpenCV
FaceFusion 6.8 | 4.0 26.8 | 53.6 16.3 | 23.9 46.9 | 82.0 43.3 | 80.7 44.9 | 86.0 43.7 | 84.8 43.1 | 83.2 45.5 | 84.2 8.6 | 4.4
FaceMorpher 3.2 | 0.7 20.1 | 36.2 11.0 | 12.0 46.4 | 84.9 44.9 | 87.1 42.8 | 92.9 43.2 | 94.8 41.2 | 80.9 44.2 | 84.0 3.4 | 0.0
OpenCV 3.3 | 0.8 20.1 | 35.8 10.7 | 11.9 48.2 | 84.7 45.8 | 85.2 44.9 | 88.9 44.3 | 88.9 42.0 | 81.5 44.4 | 83.7 3.8 | 0.8
UBO 6.3 | 3.6 24.9 | 49.9 16.8 | 24.2 48.3 | 84.2 45.3 | 84.0 44.8 | 88.5 44.8 | 87.1 42.8 | 83.0 45.1 | 84.6 7.8 | 5.8
UBO-Morpher
FaceFusion 6.7 | 4.2 26.6 | 54.2 16.4 | 24.2 47.0 | 81.0 44.4 | 81.7 43.7 | 84.2 44.0 | 85.8 42.7 | 82.5 44.8 | 84.3 8.6 | 4.4
FaceMorpher 3.8 | 1.1 21.8 | 42.3 12.8 | 17.1 45.7 | 84.7 46.7 | 87.9 39.7 | 91.2 44.2 | 94.1 41.5 | 80.9 44.2 | 86.0 3.4 | 0.0
OpenCV 3.8 | 1.2 21.6 | 39.3 12.7 | 16.5 47.1 | 84.5 46.7 | 85.4 42.6 | 87.1 44.2 | 89.5 42.5 | 81.5 44.4 | 84.2 3.8 | 0.8
UBO-Morpher 5.7 | 3.0 24.4 | 48.7 15.5 | 22.7 47.2 | 82.8 45.6 | 83.5 41.6 | 85.4 43.0 | 85.6 41.6 | 82.0 44.3 | 82.4 7.8 | 5.8
FRGCv2
FaceFusion
FaceFusion 2.1 | 0.6 13.0 | 15.4 5.3 | 3.1 15.5 | 23.8 15.9 | 28.3 18.1 | 30.2 25.9 | 49.1 39.4 | 84.4 38.9 | 75.7 6.7 | 5.1
FaceMorpher 1.1 | 0.0 9.6 | 9.4 4.3 | 1.9 14.5 | 18.8 13.8 | 24.6 12.9 | 17.4 21.9 | 38.1 41.2 | 85.5 37.6 | 71.7 4.1 | 1.3
OpenCV 1.4 | 0.0 9.8 | 9.4 4.0 | 2.4 15.9 | 27.0 16.7 | 30.2 16.9 | 28.2 24.3 | 47.9 41.3 | 87.0 39.4 | 75.8 4.2 | 1.4
UBO-Morpher 2.5 | 0.9 13.0 | 15.4 6.9 | 5.1 16.3 | 25.5 18.1 | 32.4 17.0 | 27.2 24.3 | 45.3 40.2 | 86.2 39.5 | 77.5 7.7 | 6.1
FaceMorpher
FaceFusion 2.7 | 1.1 14.4 | 18.1 7.3 | 5.7 24.9 | 47.5 23.1 | 52.0 33.0 | 63.9 37.7 | 75.7 40.6 | 82.5 39.8 | 78.6 6.7 | 5.1
FaceMorpher 0.9 | 0.0 8.4 | 6.5 3.1 | 1.2 15.1 | 21.7 15.5 | 24.3 24.6 | 46.2 31.7 | 63.1 40.8 | 83.5 39.8 | 83.7 4.1 | 1.3
OpenCV 1.1 | 0.0 8.2 | 6.8 3.9 | 1.6 19.3 | 33.0 19.3 | 40.1 30.2 | 57.2 34.6 | 69.6 41.9 | 84.8 40.8 | 81.9 4.2 | 1.4
UBO-Morpher 2.5 | 1.1 13.6 | 16.0 8.3 | 7.3 21.6 | 36.4 20.7 | 44.0 30.3 | 57.5 35.4 | 70.3 41.0 | 83.2 42.1 | 87.0 7.7 | 6.1
OpenCV
FaceFusion 2.7 | 0.9 14.0 | 19.2 7.3 | 5.3 18.4 | 31.9 19.3 | 34.0 23.9 | 44.8 30.7 | 62.4 40.8 | 83.2 38.2 | 75.2 6.7 | 5.1
FaceMorpher 0.6 | 0.0 9.3 | 8.4 2.9 | 1.1 14.1 | 18.3 15.3 | 23.9 18.6 | 33.4 25.5 | 51.3 41.3 | 85.9 35.6 | 73.1 4.1 | 1.3
OpenCV 0.9 | 0.0 8.9 | 7.9 3.4 | 1.2 15.4 | 25.3 18.1 | 30.6 21.9 | 43.0 28.8 | 58.7 41.2 | 86.3 38.0 | 75.3 4.2 | 1.4
UBO-Morpher 2.7 | 0.9 13.1 | 16.9 7.5 | 6.7 17.4 | 26.5 18.1 | 32.4 21.7 | 42.7 29.3 | 57.0 41.9 | 85.8 38.8 | 77.7 7.7 | 6.1
UBO-Morpher
FaceFusion 3.2 | 0.7 13.4 | 16.7 6.0 | 4.0 20.5 | 33.9 18.8 | 35.0 21.7 | 46.7 31.0 | 61.0 41.1 | 86.3 38.4 | 76.6 6.7 | 5.1
FaceMorpher 0.7 | 0.0 9.8 | 9.6 4.4 | 2.4 13.6 | 19.6 14.5 | 22.2 16.8 | 25.5 25.4 | 49.7 43.0 | 86.7 36.0 | 71.3 4.1 | 1.3
OpenCV 1.1 | 0.0 9.4 | 9.1 4.1 | 2.4 16.4 | 24.3 18.2 | 28.3 20.2 | 41.6 28.8 | 58.6 42.5 | 88.4 39.4 | 74.7 4.2 | 1.4
UBO-Morpher 2.4 | 0.7 11.5 | 13.6 5.4 | 4.0 17.5 | 23.9 18.2 | 27.8 19.8 | 38.8 28.4 | 56.5 40.8 | 87.2 38.7 | 75.5 7.7 | 6.1
on FRGCv2 (and thus training on FERET), the detection
performance of all MAD algorithms is much lower than
that achieved on FERET. This observation can be explained
by the fact that, as visible in Figure 2, the probes of the
FRGCv2 show a significantly higher variance in illumination,
background and sharpness, whereas the probes of the FERET
database contain pose variants, but are consistently good in
quality, see Figure 3. Similarly, our results on the MAD
based on texture descriptors and landmarks are much worse
than those reported in [7] and [11], where probe images
of higher quality were used. Thus, we conclude that the
quality of the probes has a strong effect on the detection
performance of the MAD algorithms. This further underlines
the need for databases containing probe images with realistic
characteristics.
Our MAD algorithms based on deep face representations
yields superior results compared to the majority of other
methods. The algorithm based on ArcFace features by far
outperforms all other approaches, achieving very low D-EER
between 1% and 7%. The algorithm using Eyedea features
ranks second with an D-EER between 3% and 17%. Obvi-
ously, the features of FaceNet are far less suitable for MAD.
A clear correlation to the scatter plots shown in Figure 9 can
be observed.
The texture-based MAD algorithms are only capable of
detecting morphed face images (although with very high error
rates) if the probe image is available in sufficient quality, i.e.,
on the FERET database. The detection performance of these
algorithms when probes with a more realistic variance, i.e., on
the FRGCv2 database, is close to random. The performance
of landmark-based MAD is less dependent on the quality of
probe images but generally very poor. In contrast, demorphing
in combination with the COTS face recognition system yields
good detection rates. In particular, for FRGCv2, it performs
only slightly worse than our ArcFace-based MAD for the
higher quality morphs (FaceFusion and UBO-Morpher) and
even comparably good for the lower quality morphs. However,
on the FERET database, its performance even falls behind that
of the Eyedea-based MAD algorithm.
Since the use of grayscale probe images is not expected
to significantly impact the recognition performance of face
recognition systems based on deep face representations it is
valid to assume that the proposed MAD approaches achieve
equal detection performance in case colour probe images
are processed. The same holds for MAD algorithms which
explicitly perform a grayscale conversion prior to the feature
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TABLE VI
DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF MAD ALGORITHMS BASED ON DEEP FACE REPRESENTATIONS WITH DIFFERENT POST-PROCESSINGS (PPS).
D-EER | BPCER-10 (in %)
NPP Resized JP2 PS-JP2 NPP Resized JP2 PS-JP2 NPP Resized JP2 PS-JP2
Train DB Train MA Test MA Test PP ArcFace Eyedea FaceNet
FERET
FaceMorpher
FaceFusion
NPP 7.3 | 4.6 7.2 | 4.6 7.1 | 5.0 7.3 | 5.3 16.2 | 24.6 16.2 | 24.9 16.1 | 25.3 16.5 | 25.5 27.5 | 54.5 27.5 | 54.3 27.5 | 55.4 28.1 | 56.8
Resized 7.1 | 4.5 7.1 | 4.6 7.1 | 5.0 7.3 | 5.1 16.2 | 24.9 16.2 | 25.1 16.3 | 24.9 16.7 | 25.8 26.3 | 53.4 25.8 | 53.4 26.3 | 52.6 26.7 | 56.3
JP2 7.7 | 5.9 7.7 | 6.0 7.4 | 6.2 7.7 | 6.2 16.8 | 26.7 16.9 | 26.1 16.5 | 26.1 16.8 | 26.0 26.9 | 54.1 26.8 | 54.2 26.8 | 53.8 27.8 | 55.5
PS-JP2 7.2 | 4.6 7.1 | 4.5 7.2 | 5.0 7.3 | 5.2 16.2 | 24.3 16.1 | 24.5 15.9 | 24.3 16.4 | 24.5 27.3 | 54.5 27.0 | 54.9 27.6 | 55.1 27.9 | 57.4
UBO-Morpher
NPP 6.6 | 4.2 6.6 | 4.2 6.6 | 4.4 7.0 | 4.5 17.2 | 27.4 17.2 | 26.6 17.4 | 26.9 17.1 | 26.8 25.5 | 51.8 25.7 | 51.4 25.8 | 51.6 26.1 | 54.3
Resized 6.6 | 4.2 6.7 | 4.1 6.6 | 4.4 6.8 | 4.4 17.2 | 26.3 17.3 | 26.2 17.2 | 25.9 17.1 | 26.3 25.2 | 49.5 24.7 | 49.0 24.9 | 49.5 25.8 | 51.2
JP2 7.0 | 5.0 7.0 | 4.9 6.9 | 4.9 6.7 | 4.9 17.6 | 28.3 17.4 | 27.9 17.7 | 27.7 17.4 | 27.7 25.8 | 53.9 26.1 | 51.9 26.1 | 52.6 26.7 | 53.6
PS-JP2 6.7 | 4.2 6.7 | 4.2 6.5 | 4.3 6.8 | 4.6 17.0 | 27.1 17.2 | 26.8 17.0 | 26.3 17.0 | 26.6 25.6 | 51.5 25.2 | 51.9 25.6 | 51.9 26.1 | 53.6
OpenCV
FaceFusion
NPP 6.6 | 4.0 6.6 | 3.7 6.7 | 4.0 6.8 | 4.3 16.2 | 24.6 16.2 | 24.1 16.3 | 25.2 16.4 | 25.3 27.1 | 54.8 26.8 | 54.8 26.7 | 54.9 27.3 | 56.2
Resized 6.8 | 4.0 6.7 | 4.1 6.7 | 4.4 6.9 | 4.7 16.3 | 23.9 16.1 | 23.7 16.4 | 24.8 16.7 | 25.7 26.8 | 53.6 25.5 | 52.8 25.8 | 52.5 26.5 | 54.6
JP2 7.2 | 4.9 7.0 | 4.9 7.0 | 5.2 7.0 | 5.2 16.8 | 25.6 16.6 | 25.4 16.8 | 26.2 16.5 | 26.4 26.9 | 53.4 26.1 | 53.1 26.4 | 53.9 27.0 | 55.0
PS-JP2 6.7 | 4.2 6.6 | 4.2 6.7 | 4.3 7.0 | 4.5 16.3 | 24.3 15.9 | 24.2 16.3 | 24.6 16.3 | 24.8 27.2 | 54.6 26.2 | 54.7 26.1 | 55.0 26.9 | 56.2
UBO-Morpher
NPP 6.1 | 3.5 6.0 | 3.4 6.2 | 3.7 6.4 | 4.0 16.6 | 25.7 16.8 | 25.1 16.9 | 26.5 16.6 | 26.0 25.7 | 51.4 25.1 | 50.4 25.0 | 49.4 25.4 | 52.8
Resized 6.3 | 3.6 6.3 | 3.5 6.4 | 3.8 6.5 | 4.0 16.8 | 24.2 17.0 | 24.0 17.0 | 25.3 16.8 | 25.6 24.9 | 49.9 24.1 | 48.6 24.1 | 48.9 25.1 | 50.1
JP2 6.7 | 4.0 6.5 | 4.1 6.5 | 3.9 6.4 | 4.0 17.3 | 26.4 17.3 | 26.0 17.4 | 27.7 16.9 | 26.6 25.8 | 52.7 25.7 | 52.1 25.6 | 52.0 25.7 | 52.9
PS-JP2 6.3 | 3.7 6.2 | 3.8 6.2 | 4.0 6.5 | 4.2 17.0 | 25.5 16.6 | 25.2 17.2 | 26.1 16.6 | 26.3 25.7 | 50.2 24.7 | 49.3 24.6 | 49.4 25.3 | 52.0
FRGCv2
FaceMorpher
FaceFusion
NPP 2.9 | 1.2 3.2 | 1.1 2.7 | 1.0 2.8 | 1.1 7.5 | 6.3 7.5 | 6.5 7.3 | 6.0 7.4 | 5.9 14.1 | 18.4 14.5 | 19.3 14.4 | 19.3 14.9 | 21.2
Resized 2.7 | 1.1 2.9 | 1.2 2.7 | 1.2 2.8 | 1.2 7.3 | 5.7 7.4 | 5.9 7.0 | 5.9 7.0 | 5.7 14.4 | 18.1 15.3 | 18.8 14.4 | 18.3 15.0 | 18.8
JP2 1.2 | 0.1 1.2 | 0.1 1.2 | 0.1 1.2 | 0.1 8.3 | 6.8 8.4 | 6.9 8.1 | 6.8 7.5 | 7.3 10.0 | 10.3 10.2 | 10.6 10.6 | 11.0 11.0 | 12.1
PS-JP2 2.8 | 1.0 3.0 | 1.0 3.0 | 1.0 2.9 | 1.0 7.4 | 6.0 7.8 | 6.7 7.9 | 6.5 7.4 | 6.2 14.4 | 19.2 15.3 | 20.7 15.0 | 20.2 15.8 | 21.1
UBO-Morpher
NPP 3.0 | 1.2 3.2 | 1.1 2.8 | 1.0 3.0 | 1.1 8.2 | 7.2 8.2 | 7.4 8.2 | 7.0 8.3 | 7.5 13.5 | 16.5 14.0 | 16.4 13.8 | 16.8 14.5 | 18.1
Resized 2.5 | 1.1 2.8 | 1.2 2.8 | 1.2 2.8 | 1.2 8.3 | 7.3 8.1 | 7.3 7.7 | 6.8 8.1 | 6.8 13.6 | 16.0 13.6 | 17.3 13.6 | 16.7 14.6 | 18.8
JP2 3.2 | 1.2 3.3 | 1.2 3.7 | 1.2 3.4 | 1.4 9.7 | 8.2 9.4 | 8.6 8.8 | 7.9 8.9 | 8.1 15.3 | 19.6 15.1 | 20.6 14.5 | 20.2 15.3 | 19.7
PS-JP2 2.8 | 1.0 2.8 | 1.0 2.7 | 1.0 3.0 | 1.0 8.3 | 7.4 7.9 | 7.4 8.1 | 7.3 8.1 | 7.0 14.1 | 18.2 14.1 | 19.3 14.5 | 18.3 14.8 | 19.6
OpenCV
FaceFusion
NPP 2.7 | 0.7 2.9 | 0.9 2.8 | 1.0 2.8 | 1.0 7.3 | 5.3 7.3 | 5.3 7.5 | 5.4 7.2 | 5.5 14.1 | 18.2 13.6 | 17.8 13.8 | 18.2 15.0 | 20.3
Resized 2.7 | 0.9 2.7 | 0.9 2.5 | 1.0 2.0 | 1.0 7.3 | 5.3 7.2 | 5.3 7.2 | 5.4 6.8 | 5.5 14.0 | 19.2 14.9 | 17.8 15.7 | 18.4 15.1 | 19.7
JP2 1.4 | 0.1 1.4 | 0.1 1.4 | 0.1 1.4 | 0.1 7.5 | 6.8 7.8 | 6.4 7.7 | 6.7 8.9 | 7.3 9.6 | 9.2 9.8 | 9.8 10.0 | 9.8 10.5 | 11.3
PS-JP2 2.9 | 0.9 2.9 | 0.9 2.5 | 0.7 2.4 | 1.0 7.2 | 5.3 7.0 | 5.7 7.2 | 5.5 7.3 | 5.3 14.9 | 20.0 14.0 | 18.6 14.1 | 19.8 15.5 | 21.3
UBO-Morpher
NPP 2.7 | 0.7 2.8 | 0.7 2.7 | 0.7 2.8 | 0.9 7.5 | 6.3 7.5 | 6.0 7.7 | 6.5 7.9 | 6.5 13.1 | 16.5 12.7 | 15.7 13.5 | 16.3 14.3 | 17.7
Resized 2.7 | 0.9 2.8 | 0.9 2.3 | 0.9 2.7 | 0.9 7.5 | 6.7 7.9 | 6.4 7.9 | 6.7 7.9 | 6.0 13.1 | 16.9 13.6 | 16.9 13.4 | 16.5 14.8 | 18.3
JP2 3.0 | 1.2 2.9 | 1.0 2.9 | 1.0 3.2 | 1.1 8.6 | 7.4 8.4 | 7.2 8.4 | 7.7 9.1 | 8.7 14.1 | 19.6 14.3 | 18.2 14.4 | 19.3 14.3 | 21.3
PS-JP2 2.5 | 0.9 2.7 | 0.9 2.5 | 0.7 2.7 | 0.9 7.7 | 6.4 7.9 | 6.7 8.1 | 6.4 7.5 | 6.3 13.5 | 19.4 13.0 | 17.7 13.6 | 18.1 14.8 | 18.4
extraction, e.g., MAD based on LBP or BSIF feature extrac-
tors.
A general pattern observable in the results is that morphs
with higher quality are more difficult to detect. FaceFusion
and the UBO-Morpher both include automatic post-processing,
which replaces the artefact-rich region outside the face and
therefore generate a higher error rate during MAD.9 Although
the best results are achieved if for training and test sets the
same morphing tool is used (which indicates slight overfitting
to the characteristics of the morphing process), the influence
of the morphing tool used for training is quite limited.
B. Robustness against Image Post-Processing
In this subsection, the robustness of MAD algorithms based
on deep face representations with respect to post-processing of
the reference images is investigated. All four post-processings
presented in Section III-E are separately used for training
and testing. Since we have already seen that the morphing
tool used for training is of minor importance and that higher
quality morphs (created with FaceFusion and UBO-Morpher)
are more difficult to detect, we use FaceMorpher and OpenCV
for training, and FaceFusion and UBO-Morpher for testing.
9In addition, the outer region is replaced with that from the attacker’s image
which is expected to increase the similarity in comparison with a probe image
from the attacker.
The other MAD algorithms considered in the previous section
will not be further considered, because they cannot achieve
comparable performance.
The corresponding results are shown in Table VI. As in
the previous experiment, the MAD algorithm based on deep
face represnetations extracted using ArcFace is far ahead
in detection performance, followed by the MAD algorithm
based on Eyedea. Training on post-processed images has
no noticeable influence on the detection performance of the
algorithms. Testing on post-processed images can have a slight
effect on detection performance. In general, the proposed
MAD algorithms are not severely influenced by the tested post-
processings. Presumably, this is due to the extraction of the
deep face representations by the neural networks which were
trained for a high independence from image properties.
C. Analysis of Score Distributions
As a final investigation, score distributions of the MAD
algorithm based on the ArcFace feature extraction are analyzed
in more detail. Since this MAD algorithm achieves by far
the best performance, the other two deep face representation
extractors (Eyedea and Facenet) are not considered here.
Since post-processing has no influence during training, only
algorithms trained on NPP images are considered. Trained
SVMs generate a normalized MAD score in the range [0, 1]
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Fig. 10. PDFs of the decision score of an MAD based on ArcFace features for different databases and post-processings, when trained on different morphing
attack algorithms. Low scores (close to 0) indicate to bona fide authentication attempts and high scores (close to 1) indicate MAs.
where low scores, i.e., scores close to 0, indicate bona fide
authentication attempts and high scores, i.e., scores close to 1,
refer to MAs. Figure 10 shows the resulting probability density
functions. For each subfigure, training was performed with
each morphing tool separately (the tool name is given in the
legend of the plot), while testing was performed considering
MAs using all morphing algorithms together. The database
and post-processing used for the evaluation are given in the
caption of the respective subfigure.
The observations correspond to the findings of the previous
experiments. Within a database, the score distributions are
very similar, regardless of which morphing tool is used for
training and which post-processing is used for the test set. This
further suggests that the use of a variety of different morphing
tools in the training stage is not expected to yield significant
improvement in terms of detection performance. Generally,
scores which were generated by the evaluation on FERET can
be separated better than those stemming from FRGCv2.
It is noticeable that when evaluated on FRGCv2, some bona
fide samples are very clearly, i.e., with rather high scores, mis-
classified as MAs, visible in Figure 10 (a) to (d) as a peak for
bona fides at 1. On the contrary, on FERET, misclassifications
occur mostly for MAs, which can be seen in Figure 10 (e)
to (h) as small bumps in the MA score distributions close
to 0. Examples for the above mentioned errors are given in
Figure 11 and Figure 12. If the morph is of good quality
and very similar to the sample, the MAD algorithm can no
longer detect the MA. For example, in the samples shown
in Figure 11 it is difficult even for an experienced observer
to detect the MA. Examples for wrongly classified bona fide
authentication attempts are given in Figure 12. The cause of
this error is obvious. In these examples, the strong variance
in facial expression and the presence of headgear in the probe
images are particularly noticeable. However, such a variance
can also be expected in a realistic border control scenario.
(a) Reference 1 (b) Probe 1 (c) Reference 2 (d) Probe 2
Fig. 11. Attack presentation classification error examples on FERET.
(a) Reference 1 (b) Probe 1 (c) Reference 2 (d) Probe 2
Fig. 12. Bona fide presentation classification error examples on FRGCv2.
Due to the high certainty with which the algorithm assigns
some samples to the wrong category, it is hardly possible to
correct these errors by adjusting the MAD decision threshold
value. Still, for both databases the score distributions of
MAs and bona fide authentication attempts are very clearly
separated. Thus, the error rates are quite stable within a con-
siderable range of MAD decision threshold values (operating
points), which makes the MAD algorithm very suitable for a
practical application.
D. NIST Face Recognition Vendor Test MORPH
The NIST FRVT MORPH test provides ongoing indepen-
dent testing of prototype face MAD methods. The evaluation is
designed to obtain commonly measured assessment of morph
detection capability to inform developers and end-users. The
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test opened in June 2018, and, at the time of this writing,
NIST has since received twelve different MAD algorithms.
The latest report [22] includes morph detection performance
results over thirteen datasets. On various unseen datasets
where differential MAD was evaluated the proposed method
achieved performance rates comparable to those presented in
this work. Further, it outperformed all other methods by orders
of magnitude, including implementations of single image
MAD methods based on texture descriptors, forensic image
analysis, and deep learning, i.e., [7], [18], [19], [23], [38], [39],
[56], [57], as well as differential MAD methods employing
texture descriptors and facial landmarks, i.e., [7], [11]. For
detailed results the interested reader is referred to [22]. The
submitted version of the proposed MAD method uses ArcFace
for the extraction of deep face representations. For the training
of the corresponding SVM, we utilized bona fide and morphed
reference images from the FERET and FRGCv2 databases. In
order to achieve high robustness morphed reference images
generated by all morphing tools used in this work were
considered in the training stage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the experiments conducted in this work, the
following conclusions are reached:
• Detection performance: the detection performance
achieved by MAD based on deep face representations is
promising and highly robust with respect to image post-
processing, i.e., image compression, image resizing and
even print-scan transformation. This is a clear advan-
tage over MAD based on texture descriptors, which is
typically quite sensitive to post-processing, particularly
in more challenging scenarios. Moreover, the detection
performance does not significantly depend on the post-
processing applied to the training set, so that no scanned
images are necessary for training.
• Heterogeneous morphing algorithms: morphs generated
by morphing algorithms which produce obvious artefacts,
e.g., clearly visible ghost artefacts, are generally de-
tected with higher accuracy. Furthermore, the recognition
performance slightly degrades if training and evaluation
sets contain morphs generated by different morphing
algorithms.
• Heterogeneous databases: if training and testing is con-
ducted on heterogeneous face image databases which
contain face images with different conditions, e.g., vari-
ations in pose and lightning, detection performance is
negatively affected. On databases obtained from subsets
of the publicly available FERET and the FRGCv2 face
database, experiments revealed higher detection accuracy
on the FERET subset in which probe images only contain
slight variations in expression and pose as opposed to
the FRGCv2 subset, which additionally comprises probe
images with variations in lightning and focus. It can be
concluded that strong variations in lightning and focus of
probe images represent especially challenging conditions
for differential MAD.
• Machine learning-based classifiers: among the tested ma-
chine learning-based classifiers, i.e., AdaBoost, Gradient
Boosting, Random Forest and Support Vector Machine
(SVM), SVM-based classifiers generally revealed most
competitive detection performance across the vast major-
ity of conducted experiments.
• Commercial vs. open-source: while commercial face
recognition algorithms frequently outperform correspond-
ing open-source implementations, this is not necessarily
the case for MAD. Precisely, for the task of MAD,
deep face representations obtained from open-source al-
gorithms, e.g., ArcFace, might be better suited, compared
to deep features extracted by commercial face recognition
systems.
Furthermore, this work underlines the need for realistic
databases. Not only the quality of the reference, but also the
quality of the probes has a strong influence on the detection
performance of the MAD algorithms. Therefore, for the de-
velopment of algorithms, which are deployable in a real world
scenario, it is necessary to test on realistic data. However, there
is still the problem that the exchange of databases is difficult
due to privacy regulations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research work has been funded by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research and the Hessen StateM-
inistry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within
their joint support of the National Research Center for Applied
Cybersecurity ATHENE as well as by the Federal Office of
Information Security (BSI) within the FACETRUST project.
The UBO-Morpher as well as the Demorphing implementation
was kindly provided by the University of Bologna.
REFERENCES
[1] U. Scherhag, C. Rathgeb, J. Merkle, R. Breithaupt, and C. Busch, “Face
recognition systems under morphing attacks: A survey,” IEEE Access,
vol. 7, pp. 23 012–23 026, 2019.
[2] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, “On the effects of image
alterations on face recognition accuracy,” in Face Recognition Across
the Imaging Spectrum. Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp.
195–222.
[3] D. J. Robertson, A. Mungall, D. G. Watson, K. A. Wade, S. J. Nightin-
gale, and S. Butler, “Detecting morphed passport photos: a training and
individual differences approach,” Cognitive Research: Principles and
Implications, vol. 3, no. 1, jun 2018.
[4] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, “The magic passport,” in
Proceedings of the 2014 International Joint Conference on Biometrics
(IJCB). IEEE, sep 2014.
[5] M. Gomez-Barrero, C. Rathgeb, U. Scherhag, and C. Busch, “Is your
biometric system robust to morphing attacks?” in Proceedings of the 5th
International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF). IEEE,
apr 2017.
[6] ——, “Predicting the vulnerability of biometric systems to attacks based
on morphed biometric information,” IET Biometrics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp.
333–341, jul 2018.
[7] U. Scherhag, C. Rathgeb, and C. Busch, “Towards detection of morphed
face images in electronic travel documents,” in Proceedings of the 13th
IAPR Workshop on Document Analysis Systems (DAS), 2018.
[8] P. Phillips, P. Flynn, T. Scruggs, K. Bowyer, J. Chang, K. Hoffman,
J. Marques, J. Min, and W. Worek, “Overview of the face recognition
grand challenge,” in 2005 IEEE Computer Society Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR). IEEE, 2005.
[9] U. Scherhag, D. Budhrani, M. Gomez-Barrero, and C. Busch, “Detecting
morphed face images using facial landmarks,” in Proceedings of the
2018 International Conference on Image and Signal Processing (ICISP).
Springer International Publishing, 2018, pp. 444–452.
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 14
[10] A. Martinez and R. Benavente, “The AR face database,” Computer
Vision Center (CVC), Tech. Rep. 24, Jun. 1998.
[11] N. Damer, V. Boller, Y. Wainakh, F. Boutros, P. Terhrst, A. Braun, and
A. Kuijper, “Detecting face morphing attacks by analyzing the directed
distances of facial landmarks shifts,” in Proceedings of the 40th German
Conference of Pattern Recognition (GCPR), 2018.
[12] P. Phillips, H. Wechsler, J. Huang, and P. J. Rauss, “The FERET database
and evaluation procedure for face-recognition algorithms,” Image and
Vision Computing, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 295–306, apr 1998.
[13] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, “Face demorphing,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 4, pp.
1008–1017, apr 2018.
[14] ——, “Face demorphing in the presence of facial appearance variations,”
in Proceedings of the 26th European Signal Processing Conference
(EUSIPCO), 2018.
[15] W. Gao, B. Cao, S. Shan, D. Zhou, X. Zhang, and D. Zhao, “The
CAS-PEAL large-scale chinese face database and baseline evaluations,”
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Tech. Rep. JDL-TR-04-FR-001, May
2004.
[16] F. Peng, L.-B. Zhang, and M. Long, “FD-GAN: Face de-morphing
generative adversarial network for restoring accomplice’s facial image,”
IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 75 122–75 131, 2019.
[17] A. Makrushin, T. Neubert, and J. Dittmann, “Automatic generation and
detection of visually faultless facial morphs,” in Proceedings of the
12th International Joint Conference on Computer Vision, Imaging and
Computer Graphics Theory and Applications. SCITEPRESS - Science
and Technology Publications, 2017.
[18] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, “Face morphing detection
in the presence of printing/scanning and heterogeneous image
sources,” CoRR, vol. abs/1901.08811, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.08811
[19] R. Raghavendra, K. B. Raja, S. Venkatesh, and C. Busch, “Transferable
deep-CNN features for detecting digital and print-scanned morphed face
images,” in Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW). IEEE, jul 2017.
[20] R. Raghavendra, S. Venkatesh, K. Raja, and C. Busch, “Towards making
morphing attack detection robust using hybrid scale-space colour texture
features,” in Proceedings of 5th International Conference on Identity,
Security and Behaviour Analysis (ISBA 2019), 2019, pp. 22–24.
[21] U. Scherhag, R. Raghavendra, K. B. Raja, M. Gomez-Barrero,
C. Rathgeb, and C. Busch, “On the vulnerability of face recognition
systems towards morphed face attacks,” in Proceedings of the 5th
International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF). IEEE,
Apr. 2017.
[22] M. Ngan, P. Grother, K. Hanaoka, and J. Kuo, “Face Recognition Vendor
Test (FRVT) Part 4: MORPH Performance of Automated Face Morph
Detection,” National Institute of Technology (NIST), Tech. Rep. NISTIR
8292, 2020.
[23] R. Raghavendra, K. B. Raja, and C. Busch, “Detecting morphed face im-
ages,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Biometrics
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS). IEEE, sep 2016.
[24] C. Kraetzer, A. Makrushin, T. Neubert, M. Hildebrandt, and J. Dittmann,
“Modeling attacks on photo-ID documents and applying media forensics
for the detection of facial morphing,” in Proceedings of the 5th ACM
Workshop on Information Hiding and Multimedia Security - IHMMSec
’17. ACM Press, 2017.
[25] C. Seibold, W. Samek, A. Hilsmann, and P. Eisert, “Detection of
face morphing attacks by deep learning,” in Digital Forensics and
Watermarking. Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 107–120.
[26] T. Ojala, M. Pietikinen, and D. Harwood, “A comparative study of
texture measures with classification based on featured distributions,”
Pattern Recognition, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 51–59, jan 1996.
[27] J. Kannala and E. Rahtu, “BSIF: Binarized statistical image features,” in
Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Pattern Recognition
(ICPR2012), Nov 2012, pp. 1363–1366.
[28] U. Scherhag, A. Nautsch, C. Rathgeb, M. Gomez-Barrero, R. N. J.
Veldhuis, L. Spreeuwers, M. Schils, D. Maltoni, P. Grother, S. Marcel,
R. Breithaupt, R. Raghavendra, and C. Busch, “Biometric systems under
morphing attacks: Assessment of morphing techniques and vulnerability
reporting,” in Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference of the
Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG). IEEE, sep 2017.
[29] U. Scherhag, C. Rathgeb, and C. Busch, “Performance variation of
morphed face image detection algorithms across different datasets,”
in Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Biometrics and
Forensics (IWBF). IEEE, Jun. 2018.
[30] ——, “Morph detection from single face images: a multi-algorithm
fusion approach,” in Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference
on Biometrics Engineering and Application (ICBEA). ACM, 2018.
[31] L. Spreeuwers, M. Schils, and R. Veldhuis, “Towards robust evaluation
of face morphing detection,” in Proceedings of the 26th European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), 2018.
[32] N. Damer, A. M. Saladie, A. Braun, and A. Kuijper, “MorGAN:
Recognition vulnerability and attack detectability of face morphing
attacks created by generative adversarial network,” in Proceedings of the
9th IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applications,
and Systems (BTAS). IEEE, 2018.
[33] R. Raghavendra, K. Raja, S. Venkatesh, and C. Busch, “Face morphing
versus face averaging: Vulnerability and detection,” in Proceedings of
the 2017 International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB). IEEE,
oct 2017.
[34] L. Wandzik, G. Kaeding, and R. V. Garcia, “Morphing detection using
a general-purpose face recognition system,” in Proceedings of the 26th
European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), 2018.
[35] A. Asaad and S. Jassim, “Topological data analysis for image tamper-
ing detection,” in Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on
Digital Forensics and Watermarking (IWDW). Springer International
Publishing, 2017, pp. 136–146.
[36] S. Jassim and A. Asaad, “Automatic detection of image morphing by
topology-based analysis,” in Proceedings of the 26th European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), 2018.
[37] A. Agarwal, R. Singh, M. Vatsa, and A. Noore, “SWAPPED! digital face
presentation attack detection via weighted local magnitude pattern,” in
Proceedings of the 2017 International Joint Conference on Biometrics
(IJCB). IEEE, oct 2017.
[38] L. Debiasi, U. Scherhag, C. Rathgeb, A. Uhl, and C. Busch, “PRNU-
based detection of morphed face images,” in Proceedings of the 6th
International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF). IEEE,
2018.
[39] L. Debiasi, C. Rathgeb, U. Scherhag, A. Uhl, and C. Busch, “PRNU
variance analysis for morphed face image detection,” in Proceedings of
the 9th IEEE International Conference on Biometrics: Theory, Applica-
tions, and Systems (BTAS). IEEE, 2018.
[40] U. Scherhag, L. Debiasi, C. Rathgeb, C. Busch, and A. Uhl, “Detection
of face morphing attacks based on PRNU analysis,” IEEE Transactions
on Biometrics, Behavior, and Identity Science, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[41] L. Debiasi, N. Damer, A. M. Saladi, C. Rathgeb, U. Scherhag, C. Busch,
F. Kirchbuchner, and A. Uhl, “On the detection of gan-based face
morphs using established morph detectors,” in Proceedings of the 20th
International Conference on Image Analysis and Processing (ICIAP),
2019.
[42] L.-B. Zhang, F. Peng, and M. Long, “Face morphing detection using
fourier spectrum of sensor pattern noise,” in 2018 IEEE International
Conference on Multimedia and Expo (ICME). IEEE, jul 2018.
[43] M. Hildebrandt, T. Neubert, A. Makrushin, and J. Dittmann, “Bench-
marking face morphing forgery detection: Application of StirTrace for
impact simulation of different processing steps,” in Proceedings of the
5th International Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics (IWBF). IEEE,
apr 2017.
[44] C. Seibold, A. Hilsmann, and P. Eisert, “Reflection analysis for face
morphing attack detection,” in Proceedings of the 26th European Signal
Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), 2018.
[45] C. Seibold, W. Samek, A. Hilsmann, and P. Eisert, “Accurate and
robust neural networks for security related applications exampled by
face morphing attacks,” Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pp.
1–16, 2018.
[46] International Civil Aviation Organization, “ICAO doc 9303, machine
readable travel documents – part 9: Deployment of biometric identifi-
cation and electronic storage of data in MRTDs (7th edition),” ICAO,
Tech. Rep., 2015.
[47] D. E. King, “Dlib-ml: A machine learning toolkit,” J. Mach. Learn. Res.,
vol. 10, pp. 1755–1758, Dec. 2009.
[48] A. W. Yip and P. Sinha, “Contribution of color to face recognition,”
Perception, vol. 31, no. 8, pp. 995–1003, 2002.
[49] R. Ranjan, S. Sankaranarayanan, A. Bansal, N. Bodla, J. Chen, V. M.
Patel, C. D. Castillo, and R. Chellappa, “Deep learning for understanding
faces: Machines may be just as good, or better, than humans,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 66–83, 2018.
[50] European Commission, “EU-eMRTD specification,” European Commis-
sion, Tech. Rep., 2018.
[51] FRONTEX, Best Practice Technical Guidelines for Automated Border
Control ABC Systems, September 2015.
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 15
[52] J. Deng, J. Guo, and S. Zafeiriou, “Arcface: Additive angular margin
loss for deep face recognition,” CoRR, vol. abs/1801.07698, 2018.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.07698
[53] F. Schroff, D. Kalenichenko, and J. Philbin, “FaceNet: A unified
embedding for face recognition and clustering,” in Proceedings of the
2015 Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR).
IEEE, jun 2015.
[54] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, “Information technology – biometric
presentation attack detection – part 3: Testing and reporting,” Inter-
national Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, ISO
ISO/IEC IS 30107-3:2017, 2017.
[55] Z.-H. Feng, J. Kittler, M. Awais, P. Huber, and X.-J. Wu, “Wing
loss for robust facial landmark localisation with convolutional neural
networks,” in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2018
IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2018, pp. 2235–2245.
[56] U. Scherhag, L. Debiasi, C. Rathgeb, C. Busch, and A. Uhl, “Detection
of face morphing attacks based on prnu analysis,” Transactions on
Biometrics, Behavior, and Identity Science (T-BIOM), 2019.
[57] R. Ramachandra, S. Venkatesh, K. Raja, and C. Busch, “Towards
making morphing attack detection robust using hybrid scale-space colour
texture features,” in 2019 IEEE 5th International Conference on Identity,
Security, and Behavior Analysis (ISBA), 2019, pp. 1–8.
Ulrich Scherhag received his B.Eng degree (Electri-
cal Engineering) in 2012 from the Duale Hochschule
Baden-Wrttemberg, Mannheim. He stated studying
computer science in 2014 at Hochschule Darmstadt
and received the M.Sc degree (Computer Science,
IT-Security) in 2016, for which he was granted the
CAST Award IT-Security 2016. Since 2016 he is a
Ph.D. Student Member of da/sec at the Center for
Research in Security and Privacy (CRISP). He is a
member of the European Association for Biometrics
(EAB) and a Reviewer for the International Confer-
ence of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG) and IEEE Access.
His current research focuses on presentation attack detection and morphed
face detection.
Dr. Christian Rathgeb is a Senior Researcher with
the Faculty of Computer Science, Hochschule Darm-
stadt (HDA), Germany. He is a Principal Investigator
in the Center for Research in Security and Privacy
(CRISP). His research includes pattern recognition,
iris and face recognition, security aspects of bio-
metric systems, secure process design and privacy
enhancing technologies for biometric systems. He
co-authored over 100 technical papers in the field
of biometrics. He is a winner of the EAB - Euro-
pean Biometrics Research Award 2012, the Austrian
Award of Excellence 2012, Best Poster Paper Awards (IJCB’11, IJCB’14,
ICB’15) and the Best Paper Award Bronze (ICB’18). He is a member of
the European Association for Biometrics (EAB), a Program Chair of the
International Conference of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG)
and a editorial board member of IET Biometrics (IET BMT). He has served
for various program committees and conferences (e.g. ICB, IJCB, BIOSIG,
IWBF) and journals as a reviewer (e.g. IEEE TIFS, IEEE TBIOM, IET BMT).
Dr. Johannes Merkle Johannes Merkle graduated
1995 in mathematics at the University in Frankfurt.
After working there for 3 years in the field of
cryptography, he received his PhD in mathematics
in 2000. Since 1998, he is working for as a security
consultant at secunet Security Networks, where he
focussed on cryptography, public key infrastruc-
tures, and biometric cryptosystems. He has pub-
lished several research papers on biometric template
protection, fingerprint recognition and elliptic curve
cryptography.
Prof. Dr. Christoph Busch is member of the De-
partment of Information Security and Communica-
tion Technology (IIK) at the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway. He
holds a joint appointment with the computer science
faculty at Hochschule Darmstadt (HDA), Germany.
Further he lectures Biometric Systems at Technical
University of Denmark (DTU) since 2007. Christoph
Busch co-authored more than 400 technical papers
and has been a speaker at international conferences.
He served for various program committees (NIST
IBPC, ICB, ICHB, BSI-Congress, GI-Congress, DACH, WEDELMUSIC,
EUROGRAPHICS) and served for several conferences, journals and maga-
zines as reviewer (e.g. ACM-SIGGRAPH, ACM-TISSEC, IEEE CG&A, IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, on Information Forensics and Security, on
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence and the Elsevier Journal Computers
& Security). He is also an appointed member of the editorial board of the IET
journal on Biometrics and of IEEE TIFS journal. Furthermore, he chairs the
biometrics working group of the TeleTrusT association as well as the German
standardization body on Biometrics (DIN-NIA37). He is convenor of WG3
in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 on Biometrics and active member of CEN TC 224
WG18.
